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Abstract In Cameroon, the provisions of Decree No. 76-166 of 27 April 1976 to establish the terms and
conditions for the management of national lands require that each national land recipient, whether held by
grant or on lease, must pay annual fees. This revenue is apportioned to the State, the local council and village
communities. However, the exact situation of the land fee payment and sharing has not been systematically
documented. This article assesses the distribution of revenue generated from land fees and draws broad
lessons on how beneﬁts can be shared between actors involved in large-scale land-related investments. It
establishes the socio-economic impacts and governance arrangements, and evaluates their effectiveness,
efﬁciency and equity in delivering concrete beneﬁts to local communities in 40 villages situated around ﬁve
agro-industrial plantations. It shows that actual land beneﬁt sharing does not fulﬁl the requirements for
efﬁciency, effectiveness and equity and suggests some reforms.
Au Cameroun, les dispositions du décret nº 76-166 du 27 avril 1976 ﬁxant les conditions et modalités de
gestion du domaine national exigent que tout utilisateur du domaine national, que ce soit en tant que
concessionnaire ou locataire, verse une redevance annuelle. Ces recettes sont alors réparties entre l'État, le
conseil local et les communautés villageoises. Toutefois, la situation exacte concernant le paiement des
redevances et leur répartition n’est pas systématiquement documentée. Cet article examine la répartition des
recettes provenant des redevances foncières et en tire des enseignements généraux sur la manière dont les
bénéﬁces peuvent être répartis entre les acteurs impliqués dans de grands projets d'investissement liés au
foncier. Sur la base d’un échantillon de 40 villages situés aux environs de cinq plantations agro-industrielles,
l’article fait une estimation des impacts socioéconomiques ainsi que des dispositifs de gouvernance, dont il
évalue l'efﬁcience, l'efﬁcacité et le degré d'équité en termes de distribution de bénéﬁces concrets aux
communautés locales. Il montre que le partage des bénéﬁces fonciers tel qu’il est effectué ne satisfait pas les
exigences en matière d'efﬁcacité, d’efﬁcience et d’équité, et conclut en offrant quelques suggestions de
réformes.
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Introduction
Public discussion on the design of REDD+ mechanisms and the global phenomenon of land
grabbing in developing countries has once more brought the issue of the distribution of tenure
rights and land rent into the limelight (Chauveau et al, 2006; Toulmin et al, 2011). According to
mainstream literature on this issue, if there are no clearly deﬁned land rights, the payment of
land rents could be jeopardized and inequitable (Sunderlin et al, 2009; Costenbader, 2010;
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Peskett, 2011). Cameroon has pioneered a mechanism for the payment of land rents to the State,
councils and village communities within the framework of the 1974 Land Law. Evaluating this
land rent distribution mechanism is timely for three reasons. First, it helps draw lessons that could
serve as a guide in the establishment of a mechanism for the payment of REDD revenue. Second,
it contributes to the clariﬁcation of the legal basis for the management of national land in
Cameroon in view of growing demand for farmland by local and foreign economic operators
(Cotula et al, 2009; Derek and Deininger, 2011). In this regard, Cameroon grapples with a high
demand for farmland by multinationals and the domestic elite, such that several preliminary
contracts do not comply with the provisions of the legislation (Nguiffo and Schwartz, 2012;
Pigeaud, 2012). Finally, it sheds light on the contribution of land rent to rural poverty alleviation
strategies and questions the effectiveness, efﬁciency and equity of the system established by State
authorities (Angelsen, 2009).
The main objective of this article is to assess the mechanism of the distribution of land
rent fees from agro-industry in Cameroon with a view to drawing lessons that could be used to
design REDD+ beneﬁt-sharing mechanisms and help combat rural poverty within a context
marked by growing demand for farmland and the granting of mining permits (Deininger, 20111;
Schwartz et al, 2012). From this perspective, the ﬁrst section is a summary of the theoretical and
legal bases of land rent in Cameroon. The second part of the article focuses on the methodological
considerations of the study. The third section discusses the key ﬁndings. This article concludes
with recommendations for system readjustment.
Conceptual and Legal Frameworks of Land Rent in Cameroon
Mechanisms for the distribution of land rent are designed within the framework of the manage-
ment of shared natural resources. Land, which can be considered as a common resource,
cannot deviate from this designation (Ostrom, 1990, 1999), particularly in Africa where it has
always been considered a collective asset (Verdier, 1971; Kouassigan, 1982; Diaw, 2005). In this
respect, land rent may be associated with payment for the use of collective land resources (Carret,
2000). According to the Ricardian conception, the three determinants of the price of land are land
rent, interest rate and expectations of economic agents (Just and Miranowski, 1993; Weersink
et al, 1999). In this way, David Ricardo noted that agricultural land could be distinguished
according to its fertility. Land in the most fertile areas can produce a given quantity of food at
a lower cost than lands in the second most fertile class. Similarly, land in the second most fertile
area is worth more than in the third area class. Land rent, which is considered ‘Nature’s gift’ to
the owner (Karsenty, 2000), is a ‘fraction of proﬁts above what would be strictly necessary for
the capital to remain invested in a given economic activity’ (Bannock et al, 2003, p. 113). In rural
areas, land rent may be derived from agriculture, forestry or mining. Land rent may be considered
as a monetary contribution for the use of a natural resource (land), regarded as a national heritage,
which is one of the tools used to collect revenue (Karsenty, 2002). It is therefore an economic rent
based on land area allocated to private operators by the holder of ownership rights (Stiglitz,
1996). From the point of view of Campbell Black (1979), rente foncière is a rent paid on land
and generally forms part of a long-term lease. It should therefore be distinguished from payment
under a lease of a shorter duration. Another meaning of the concept of rent can be drawn from
the REDD+ beneﬁt-sharing debate. In this framework, rent represents the difference between the
cost of implementing REDD+ and the average global carbon price at which emission reduction
credits from REDD could be sold (Peskett, 2011, p. 5). Therefore, rent is the proﬁt that could
be made from REDD+ (Karsenty et al, 2012). In addition to the direct beneﬁts arising from
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REDD+ implementation, indirect beneﬁts, which comprise improved governance, such as
strengthening of tenure and law enforcement related to REDD+ readiness, could be expected
(Luttrell et al, 2012).
Finally, land rent can be considered as ﬁnancial compensation paid to the legitimate right
holders of land by any external operator. It is similar to the environmental fee paid to compensate
for damage caused to the rightful landowners by colonial and postcolonial administrations
(Lipietz, 1999; Assembe-Mvondo, 2005; Assembe-Mvondo, 2006a). However, it is important
not to confuse land rent with other ordinary compensation mechanisms. From this perspective,
Karsenty et al (2012) consider that the REDD+ and carbon-oriented Payment for Ecosystem
Services (PES) common principle are designed in very different ways, as they require an active
contribution to the production of emission mitigation. Therefore, carbon rights cannot be charac-
terized as a right to a carbon rent (Karsenty et al, 2012). Whatever the case, it is acknowledged
that the proper distribution of land rent and, to some extent, REDD+ beneﬁts to various social
groups depends in part on the existence of a revenue management mechanism based on the
principles of transparency, accountability and absence of tampering (Fischer, 2007).
From the legal standpoint, the basis of land rent in Cameroon is set out in Article 17 of
Decree No. 76-166 of 27 April 1976 to establish the terms and conditions of management of
national lands:
The income received from the allocation of national lands, whether held by grant or on lease, shall be
apportioned 40% to the State, 40% to the council in whose area the land is situated, and 20% per cent for
use in the public interest to the village community concerned.
It should be clariﬁed here that, in Cameroon, there are two main land domains: (i) the national
lands that are governed by ordinance No 74-1 of 6 July 1974 to establish rules on land tenure;
(ii) State lands governed by Ordinance No 74-2 of 6 July 1974 to establish rules on State lands.
For Leonard and Longbottom (2000, p. 21), national land is a speciﬁc legal category, distinct
from State property. Although the State reserves the right to manage these lands, this national
property belongs to the Nation. In fact, in the quest to build a nation, it was essential to break the
communal basis of land tenure systems to detribalize them (Melone, 1972). In reality, the
intention of the authorities was to abandon the colonial theory of ‘vacant land without owners’
and to replace it with a national land heritage akin to classical public and private land. As a
consequence, the decision by Cameroonian authorities to institutionalize a land rent on behalf of
the State, councils and local communities within the framework of the concession or lease of land
in the national domain is based on its ownership regime. According to the provisions of Articles
1(2) and 16(a) of Ordinance No. 74-1 of 6 July 1974 to establish rules governing land tenure in
Cameroon: ‘The State shall be the guardian of all lands’ and ‘national lands shall be administered
by the State in such a way as to ensure rational use and development thereof’.
De jure and de facto, the Cameroonian nation is the rightful owner of national land (Tjouen,
1981; Pougoue and Bachelet, 1982; Nyama, 2001; Tientcheu, 2005). However, the State
of Cameroon plays the role of legal overseer of national heritage. This legal consideration puts
into perspective the thesis advanced repeatedly of the State’s quasi-monopoly ownership over
land in Cameroon (Cotula and Mayers, 2009; Alden Wily, 2011; Hatcher and Bailey, 2011).
These authors neglect the borderline between the concepts of State (all the political institutions of
a country) and Nation (all people who share a common history) in constitutional law (Hauss,
2011; Assembe-Mvondo et al, 2013). As Hobbs (1998) concluded, Cameroon has a complex
land tenure legacy as a result of colonial occupation by three different countries (Germany, the
United Kingdom and France), each of which contributed distinct characteristics to future land
legislation initiatives. However, it is recognized that the status of nation-owner of national land
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is vague and uncertain from the legal standpoint because a nation has no legal personality.
Legal status would therefore mostly beneﬁt representatives of the neo-patrimonial state who do
not manage the national heritage according to bonus pater familias at the expense of local
communities and ordinary citizens (Fisiy, 1992, p. 116; Bratton and Van de Walle, 1994;
Karsenty and Assembe-Mvondo, 2011, p. 115). The institutionalization and redistribution of
land rent between State institutions (the State and local councils) on the one hand and local
communities on the other is the implicit recognition by regulatory authorities that the national
land in the domain they are managing belongs to the people of Cameroon. Thus, it is quite
logical that the legal and rightful owners (local communities/indigenous people) are the main
beneﬁciaries of land rent. Although one can question the 20 per cent rate paid to the local
populations, it should, however, be recognized that this mechanism can rectify or minimize the
historical land injustice suffered by ethnic communities since the advent of German colonial rule
in Cameroon (Ngongo, 1987).
The land rent mechanism in force in Cameroon will be assessed in this framework by using
the effectiveness, efﬁciency and equity criteria. We are borrowing this broader conceptual
approach introduced by Angelsen (2008, 2009, p. 5) in the context of REDD+ to better assess
the land fees mechanism performance in Cameroon. As Angelsen (2008, p. 61) explains, the
effectiveness, efﬁciency and equity criteria can be used to evaluate options and results produced
by REDD+, including any other mechanism whether based on performance or not. In this respect,
effectiveness assesses whether the current mechanism is likely to achieve set objectives: are
the overall land fees targets met? Efﬁciency should emphasize transaction costs induced by the
attainment of set objectives: are the targets being achieved at minimum cost? And equity is
expected to give a picture of the distribution model promoted by the current mechanism: are the
beneﬁts shared and the costs allocated fairly?
Methods and Study Sites
This study was carried out in several phases with conventional social science methods used
to collect both qualitative and quantitative data. During the ﬁrst phase, literature on land rent and
tenure, as well as land legislation, in Cameroon was reviewed. The second phase consisted of
ﬁeld visits to verify the effective implementation of the regulatory land rent distribution
mechanism in Cameroon. To that end, ﬁve subsidiaries of multinationals operating in the agro-
industrial sector in Cameroon were selected, based on agricultural commodities and land area.
Ten elected mayors of 10 councils (Souza, Mbanga, Penja, Loum, Kribi, Niete, Edéa 1,
Mbandjock, Nkoteng and Lembe-Yezoum) were interviewed on the effectiveness of the
application of regulatory provisions and social impacts of land rent in their localities. In each
of the 10 councils, four villages located near agro-industrial complexes were visited. At
every stage, a focus-group discussion was held with local communities in the presence of
traditional leaders in the 40 villages visited. Discussions focused on the effectiveness of
land fees (if they really received them); the identiﬁcation and number of socio-economic
infrastructures built by using land rent paid to the village; the village’s needs in terms of
community facilities; and the perception of the land rent mechanism as fair compensation for
customary land rights restricted by the establishment of agro-industries. During ﬁeld trips,
triangulation was carried out to verify information obtained, particularly through the observation
of some socio-economic structures.
The third phase consisted of conducting interviews and collecting quantitative data from
the four high-ranking ofﬁcials of Cameroon’s Ministry of State Property and Land Tenure
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at the central (two) and regional (two) levels, and seven mid-level managers in each of the
agro-industries. We have decided to keep this agro-industries sample anonymous to avoid any
judicial action or accusation and to maintain scientiﬁc objectivity.
● The ﬁrst agro-industrial complex visited (Company No. 1) operates in the oil palm sector.
This company was set up in 1968 by the State of Cameroon and privatized in 2000 under the
framework of the Structural Adjustment Programme. This company has ﬁve oil palm
plantations located in six councils in three different regions and covers over 78 529 ha. It is
the major palm oil producer with 42 per cent of national production. It is a subsidiary of
a French multinational that is well known in Africa and Asia (Gerber, 2008; SHERPA,
2010). The company has started to diversify its activities into rubber cultivation and bio-fuel
production for domestic purposes.
● The second agro-industrial complex (Company No. 2) is involved in rubber cultivation. It
was established in 1975 by the State of Cameroon and bought by a Singaporean multi-
national within the framework of privatization in 1996. This company has an emphyteutic
lease covering 41 339 ha from the State of Cameroon (Gerber, 2008). The multinational runs
rubber plantations and is presently experiencing internal transformation with regard to its
main shareholding, which passed into the hands of a Chinese company in August 2008
(GMG, 2010).
● The third agro-industrial complex (Company No. 3) operates in the banana sector. It is the
leading producer of bananas nationally with an output of 137 000 tons per year. This
company, which is a subsidiary of a French group, occupies an area of 4500 ha of farmland
distributed between two councils and several villages (CCFD, 2009). It was bought from the
Government of Cameroon in 1991 during the liquidation of the Ofﬁce Camerounais de la
Banane. This company also produces pineapples and pepper for export.
● The fourth agro-industrial complex (Company No. 4) also operates in the banana sector. Its
annual production is approximately 40 000 tons/year. It occupies a land area of 800 ha
obtained through concession. It is a subsidiary of a French group involved in tropical fruit
production (CCFD, 2009).
● The ﬁfth agro-industrial complex (Company No 5) is involved in sugarcane production. The
company occupies an area of more than 22 000 ha under an emphyteutic lease from the State
of Cameroon. Company No. 5 launched its operations in the mid-1960s in partnership with a
French company and minority public shareholding. It experienced renewed vibrancy in
2006 with the purchase of the assets of the defunct public sugar company located at
Nkoteng. It is now part of a French multinational. It produces more than 140 000 tons of
sugar annually (SOMEDIAA, 2012).
Results
Legal Nature of Occupied Land
Land rent is payable to the State, councils and local communities when land allocated under
a lease (foreign nationality) or as part of a concession (Cameroonian nationality) is located in the
national domain. Within the framework of this study, two of the ﬁve companies are partly
operating in the national domain. This includes Company No. 1 and Company No. 5. In the case
of Company No. 1, more than half of the 78 529 ha fall within the national domain, whereas in the
case of Company No. 5 the 2006 emphyteutic lease provided that 11 980 ha were in the national
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domain. However, lately, this company seems to have increased the surface area to 15 800 ha. For
their part, the other three companies operate on land belonging to the State. Consequently, all
rents on land over which the State has full and complete ownership must be paid into the State
treasury. Thus, councils and local communities located near Companies No. 2, 3 and 4 in
principle do not receive any land rent. Local respondents afﬁrmed they were not aware of the
existence of such a legal mechanism. The respondents’ understanding is that the company is
operating on their ancestral lands, for which they receive no compensation payments, either
directly through the company or through the state. During the research, local informants indicated
that Companies No. 3 and 4 do not only operate on state-owned land, but they also signed leases
for land owned by some families or traditional communities, who have land titles (Nguiffo and
Schwartz, 2012). This indicates the existence of hybrid types of legal occupation among these
companies (Table 1).
Actual Payment of Land Rent
It was not possible to obtain ofﬁcial documents conﬁrming that Company No. 1 actually pays
land rent as legally required. A request for an interview with the head of the company’s legal
department was met with a categorical refusal to disclose ‘information considered as strategic’.
This lack of transparency was conﬁrmed in interviews with the local authorities of the four
councils and several nearby villages likely to beneﬁt from portions of the land rent paid by
Company No. 1. In fact, the local elected ofﬁcials visited said that they were not aware of the
existence of this mechanism. Furthermore, they said that their local councils have never received
any portion of rent from agro-industry No. 1. Similar statements were made by residents of the
nearby villages. The ofﬁcials of the central and regional services of the Ministry of State Property
and Land Tenure believe that Company No. 1 pays land rents to the General Directorate of
Taxation. They also afﬁrmed that those in charge of collecting taxes do not distribute the revenue
Table 1: Summary of overview of the sample study on land fees situation in Cameroon




Land rent payment status Commodities
Company No. 1 National land 78 529 Not declared. Data are not
publicly available. Nothing
paid to the local councils and
local communities
Oil palm
Company No. 2 State land 41 339 No Rubber
Company No. 3 State land
(mainly)
4500 No Banana
Company No. 4 State land
(mainly)
800 No Banana
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as stipulated by the regulations. In any case, portions of the land rent paid by the oil palm agro-
industry and destined for local councils and communities are not redistributed at the local level.
However, it was noted that Company No. 5 actually pays land royalties to the three councils
and eight village communities in which its sugarcane plantations are located. In this regard, the
contractual terms of the emphyteutic lease concluded between the company and the State of
Cameroon include the provision set out in Article 17 of the 1976 Decree: 40 per cent for the State,
40 per cent for the three local councils and 20 per cent for the eight surrounding villages. Thus,
Company No. 5 pays EUR 118 099 annually as land rent for the 11 980 ha occupied to the Land
Revenue Administration. Table 2 shows the distribution of the land rent according to the lease
signed in 2006.
The authorities from the three local councils conﬁrmed having received their share of the land
rent as provided for in the lease contract. These amounts are transferred at the beginning of each
year by cheque payable to the council. However, the Mbandjock council received a cheque for
EUR 15 267 for the 2012 ﬁnancial year, instead of EUR 10 252 provided for in the 2006 lease
contract. This increase is because the agro-industry increased its land in the national domain from
11 980 ha to 15 800 ha. In this respect, the total amount paid as land rent in January 2012 for
15 800 ha was EUR 155 725, representing an increase of EUR 37 626 compared with the amount
in the original 2006 lease contract. However, the increase in land area was not reﬂected in the two
other councils and villages, suggesting that the land is located in the Mbandjock council area. At
the village level, communities acknowledged having received the amounts stipulated in the 2006
lease contract each year.
Use of Land Rent by Main Beneﬁciaries
The local authorities of the three councils stated that money received as payment of annual land
rent is part of their ordinary budget expenditure. The revenue contributes to the salaries of council
workers at the start of the budgetary year. For their part, some villages have invested their
resources in school infrastructure through the construction and rehabilitation of classrooms
and residences for school principals, particularly payments made during the ﬁrst two years (2007
and 2008). This statement was veriﬁed in two villages where the infrastructure actually exists,
Table 2: Summary of land rent paid by the sugarcane Company No. 5 during the latest 5 years
Stakeholders Annual land
rent in CFA F
Expected annual
land rent in EUR
Actual cumulative sum
in 5 years in EUR
State (Treasury) 30 941 944 47 239.6 236 198.0
Mbandjock Council 6 715 280 10 252.3 51 261.5
Nkoteng Council 13 637 184 20 820.1 104 100.5
Lembe-Yezoum Council 10 589 480 16 167.1 80 835.5
Ndo village 2 066 240 3154.5 15 772.5
Biboto village 1 291 400 1971.6 9858.5
Simbane village 4 132 480 6309.1 31 545.5
Messassa village 1 162 260 1774.4 8872.5
Ebometende village 2 272 864 3470.0 17 350.0
Mvan village 710 270 1084.3 5421.5
Ouassa Baboute village 3 196 215 4879.7 24 398.5
Elap village 639 243 975.9 4879.5
Total 77 354 860 118 099.0 590 495.0
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notably the refurbishment of two classrooms and construction of two residences in primary
schools in the case of Ouassa Baboute. Local actors, however, acknowledge that the money
received during the last three years has not been used in this way because it was distributed to
families in different villages for celebrations and other sundry expenses.
Perceptions of Local Actors
Four council authorities and 16 of the 40 local communities interviewed around agro-industries
do not beneﬁt from land rents because the land granted is part of State land. They have expressed
their anger against the State and economic operators, accusing them of theft and land grabbing.
They complained they were victims of land injustice. In their view, land rent should be consi-
dered a legitimate ﬁnancial compensation for the loss of their ancestral land. Thus, they believe
that the State, which is the current legal owner, must pay substantial reparations in kind or
monies. Their minimum claims are for these agro-industries to grant them direct annual privileges
in terms of building collective facilities and meeting related communities’ needs. In contrast, the
three local councils and eight village communities that beneﬁt from land rent on the land in the
national domain in their area believe that such income is also legitimate and suitable ﬁnancial
compensation for the loss of their ancestral lands. However, they are not quite satisﬁed with the
amounts paid, which are low with respect to area and community infrastructural needs. Finally,
local communities near industrial oil palm plantations located in the national domain who do
not beneﬁt from land royalties feel that their legal rights and entitlement must be restored as
soon as possible. Otherwise, protests will be organized against the agro-industrial complex
(Carrere, 2007).
Discussion
Effectiveness of the Mechanism
The objectives of the regulatory authority in 1976, through the institutionalization of a land rent
redistribution mechanism, are not clearly deﬁned in any ofﬁcial document. However, one can
deduce that in a context marked by simmering disputes about what can be considered as the
nationalization of land rightfully belonging to local communities (Tientcheu, 2005; Diaw, 2010),
the objective of public authorities was to calm the anger of local communities and indigenous
people by allocating a portion of annual revenue from land exploitation. In this vein, land rent
seems to have been designed as ﬁnancial compensation for land lost by local communities and
reparation for the damage caused by the incorporation of customary lands into emerging national
lands.
The land rent distribution mechanism, as seen in the study sample, appears to be inconsistent.
In fact, it is not functional and cannot be applied effectively in some local councils and
communities located near oil palm plantations belonging to Company No. 1. Thus, the mecha-
nism is not effective because potential beneﬁciaries do not receive any portion of land rent.
Nonetheless, local actors in communities near sugarcane plantations receive their respective
portions of land rent every year (see Table 2). This second situation shows the effective imple-
mentation of the mechanism established by the 1976 Decree. Obviously, the results of the distri-
bution of land rent in Cameroon are ambivalent. Such a situation seems to largely explain – and
can be linked to – general and endemic poor governance prevailing in Cameroon since the early
1990s (Sindjoun, 1996; Malaquais, 2001; Assembe-Mvondo, 2009; Crisis Group, 2010). Thus,
Assembe-Mvondo et al
648 © 2013 European Association of Development Research and Training Institutes 0957-8811
European Journal of Development Research Vol. 25, 4, 641–656
a correlation can be made between this situation and that of recurrent denunciations of the poor
living conditions of employees and local communities residing near this oil palm agro-industrial
complex made by some observers and civil society (Gerber, 2008; SHERPA, 2010). Finally, it
was clear from interviewing ofﬁcials in charge of land administration (in central services) that
the payment of land rents by many operators occupying land in the national domain throughout
the territory is unclear. In this regard, as one interviewee of the Ministry of State Property and
Land Tenure suggested there may be cases of systematic fraudulent manipulation and personal
enrichment by the public employees of decentralized services of the ministry in charge of land
tenure responsible for collecting such revenue.2 This trend of the embezzlement of State funds by
ministry ofﬁcials has recently been conﬁrmed by the National Anti-Corruption Commission
Report (CONAC, 2012). In fact, the CONAC Report (2012, pp. 152–174) shows that around
EUR 30 million was misappropriated in 2011 by many people in collusion with the ofﬁcials of
the land administration in the case of the construction of the Kribi Deep Sea Port Project ﬁnancial
compensation.
Such mismanagement of land revenue apparently is not an isolated practice in Cameroon.
In fact, Oyono et al (2006, pp. 9–10) observed the same practices in the case of forest revenue:
‘The circulation and investment of Annual Forest Fees for village communities are marked
by embezzlement and corruption at the level of mayors and regional administrative authorities,
via the preparation of ﬁctitious projects, and resulting in the absence or insufﬁciency of
socioeconomic development’.
Thus, the objectives sought by public authorities through the institutionalization of compen-
satory rent are jeopardized. This is because, like local communities and councils located near oil
palm plantations, other local actors residing near plantations established in the national domain
do not receive their rightful ﬁnancial compensation. These practices run contrary to State choice/
public opinion and the regulations in force, and cause feelings of injustice among victims of
the State authorities’ practices and the agro-capitalist model of land management experienced
by local communities in Cameroon (Konings, 1986; Oyono, 2005; Gerber, 2008). Therefore,
these results conﬁrm the observation made by Courade (1984), who revealed contradictions in
Cameroon’s agricultural policy in the 1980s between heavy investments for the development of
agro-industrial complexes and the promotion of a discourse on smallholdings without investment
(Janin, 1996).
Efﬁciency of the Redistribution Mechanism
Land rent paid by the sugarcane company (No. 5) is distributed by the divisional tax ofﬁce (see
Table 2), situated approximately 50 km from key beneﬁciaries. This decentralized service of
the ministry in charge of land tenure directly hands out the cheques issued by the company to the
various beneﬁciaries. The rent redistribution circuit is short and avoids the intermediaries and red
tape that characterizes central administration in Cameroon (Cerutti et al, 2010). Accordingly,
costs of transactions and embezzlement of land rent by the national elite are minimized by
eliminating the bureaucracy prevailing in most centralized public systems (Ribot, 2002).
Therefore, it can be concluded that the revenue-sharing mechanism is efﬁcient in this case
because transaction costs are reduced.
In contrast, Company No. 1 paid royalties directly to the General Directorate of Taxation in
the capital city of Yaoundé situated more than 300 km from the main beneﬁciaries of the rent,
which falls within the logic of centralization of power, a phenomenon already documented by
Oyono (2004). Furthermore, in supposing that Company No. 1 pays land rent to the central tax
ofﬁce, the tax is mixed with other taxes due from this company, such that it would be unlawful for
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tax authorities to not transfer the portions unpaid to local stakeholders. Thus, transaction costs
turn out to be high and risky. This partly explains the non-transfer of portions of rent due to each
local actor. Consequently, the mechanism is inefﬁcient in the second case.
Equity in the Distribution of Land Rents in Cameroon
The objective of the regulatory authority was to maintain a kind of (utility) equity in the
distribution of proceeds derived from the payment of land rents among the State, local councils
and local communities. In other words, by establishing land rent in Cameroon, State authorities
wanted a distributive equity or justice among these three stakeholders (Rawls, 1971; Konow,
2003; McDermott et al, 2012). This would induce vertical equity in country land tenure policy
(Luttrell et al, 2012). The capture of economic rent from land seems to be more a question of
social distribution of proﬁts from land lease operations in the national domain than an incentive
factor for local communities to accept the Cameroonian land tenure system. However, the
percentages prescribed are unbalanced and do not favour local communities, which, though being
the customary owners of national lands, receive only 20 per cent of the total amount. In other
words, the Cameroonian model does not promote equitable compensation among stakeholders.
Consequently, there is a perception of inequity in terms of percentages of distribution of land
rents to stakeholders. Certainly, there is more or less equal opportunity in terms of safeguards to
ensure marginalized groups and the poor have an equal chance of participating in the system.
However, such a model still contributes to the unfairness perpetuated against local communities
by administrative elites who develop a vertical system of relationships with rural actors
(Geschiere, 1984, 1986).
The other component deals with intergenerational equity. This relationship seems to be
missing from the Cameroonian model. Indeed, by allocating land in the national domain to
economic operators, the State seems to pay more attention to the current generation and their
needs, without necessarily considering the future. The management of land rents by beneﬁciary
local and regional authorities also does not favour sustainable infrastructure that could be used by
future generations. Instead, land revenue is used for the current needs of councils, particularly the
payment of salaries to their employees, obliging local communities to invest in community
infrastructure. Examples include the construction and renovation of some classrooms that could
serve future generations. The current practice of using land revenue to meet the immediate needs
of communities can be observed clearly in Ouassa Baboute, Ebometende, Simbane and Mvan.
This is contrary to regulatory requirements, particularly in terms of intergenerational equity.
According to some villagers, ﬁnancial income obtained directly from land rent fees has not yet
produced any signiﬁcant improvement in living conditions or the acquisition of primary assets.
Even the implementation of community projects has not reduced endemic poverty at the
household level. These practices are similar to those already documented in the case of forest
revenue management (Assembe-Mvondo, 2006b; Lescuyer et al, 2008; Oyono et al, 2009;
Cerutti et al, 2010). In this regard, the revenue derived from the exploitation of land in the
national domain is not better used than forest royalties. Beneﬁts from land rent are not
meaningfully invested in health, electricity, water and education facilities. Therefore, the same
logic of the actions of local actors prevails for both types of royalties.
The Cameroonian land rent fees system, in the absence of a clear consistent rule, is organized
with both de jure and de facto practice along two axes: a vertical axis that governs the sharing of
beneﬁt from national level to the local and a horizontal axis between and within local councils
and communities. The results of this study show that there are shortcomings in the vertical axis;
this is one reason why local councils and communities situated around Company No. 1 do not
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receive their portion; whereas the horizontal axis of the land fees mechanism seems to function as
shown by Company No. 5. Therefore, it is possible to conclude the system has not been designed
to maximize equity among stakeholders.
Finally, the case of Company No. 1, which seems to enjoy some generousity from administra-
tive authorities, clearly shows that the current model implemented in Cameroon is porous,
incomplete and unfair. It favours the relationship between the State and economic operators to the
detriment of councils, particularly local communities living near the plantations. Thus, the impacts
of the current mechanism are contrary to the principle of distributive equity. Furthermore, as
demonstrated by Gerber (2011), in such a situation where local people have lost their customary
lands to agro-industrial plantations, there will be, sooner or later, protests and violent conﬂicts
between the oppressed locals and the State–Company. In fact, most agro-industrial conﬂicts in
Cameroon are historically connected to the large-scale occupation of customary land used by local
people (Meek, 1957; Oyono, 2005; Kofele-Kale, 2007; Gerber, 2008).
Conclusion
Overall, the land rent distribution mechanism in Cameroon appears to be characterized by two
contrasting scenarios. Article 16 of Decree No. 76-166 of 27 April 1976 to lay down conditions
for the management of national lands provides that: ‘The price to be paid by grantees of national
lands shall insofar as necessary be ﬁxed by a separate enactment’. This particular instrument has,
as yet, not been enacted. This explains why, in the case of the Company No. 5, the rent per
hectare of land ﬁxed in the lease contract is about EUR 10, whereas in the case of a new oil palm
agro-industry situated in South West it is EUR 0.91/ha (Nguiffo and Schwartz, 2012, p. 6). Such
low annual rental payments on land leases have been highlighted by Toulmin et al (2011, p. 41).
It also appears to be fairly accurate when compared with the forest royalties’ annual payment
(Bigombé, 2010). Indeed, though not perfect, the system of redistribution of annual forestry fees
(Oyono et al, 2009; Cerutti et al, 2010) nevertheless enables the collection of almost all the
related statistics, although it is difﬁcult or impossible to obtain reliable statistics on national land
allocated and the revenue derived from the payment of land fees throughout the entire territory.
This chaotic situation seems to be deliberately orchestrated by the Ministry of Land Tenure to
maintain the non-transparent management of a common property (belonging to the Nation) that
would mainly beneﬁt the weak social sector and not the administrative elite (Fisyi, 1992;
Bigombe and Menthong, 1996). As stressed by Karsenty (2010), a concept of national land/
domain is inconsistent, its successful management depends mostly on how it is interpreted and
used by the public authorities and also by common citizens.
The mechanism for land rent redistribution is based on land in the national domain that is
granted or leased to economic operators in Cameroon. It is not really effective, efﬁcient or
equitable. In other words, the Cameroonian model of land fees sharing is incomplete, poorly
designed and lacks a viable monitoring mechanism. This is why there are many shortcomings and
challenges to its implementation on the ground. Thus, the objective of public authorities to pay
ﬁnancial compensation to local communities is far from being achieved. On the contrary,
collusion between agro-industrial operators and some government ofﬁcials, and the porosity of
the regulations within the current system jeopardize the rights of local communities and
neighbouring councils. This runs counter to the objective of poverty alleviation in the rural areas
of Cameroon. The Cameroonian model has conﬁrmed the fact that, in the absence of clear and fair
mechanisms to ensure inclusion of poor landholders, the concession model would favour large
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commercial concessionaires and the State in beneﬁt sharing (Costenbader, 2010; Peskett, 2011;
Luttrell et al, 2012).
Even if the land rent fee programme differs from REDD+ beneﬁt sharing (Karsenty et al,
2012), one of the key lessons from Cameroon is that it is possible to design a system for the
sharing of REDD+ revenue based on the legitimate interests of stakeholders on collective land
such as the national domain in Cameroon (Ostrom, 1990; Schlager and Ostrom, 1992), and not
necessarily on real property rights (Deininger and Binswanger, 1999). However, assuming that
revenue-sharing mechanisms based on the theory of common-pool resources will be established,
it is necessary to avoid the shortcomings and ensuing negative impacts of the current
Cameroonian model.
Another lesson we can draw from this case is that in the context of a multi-level governance
system (centralized versus decentralized), the beneﬁt-sharing mechanism should be decentralized
to minimize transaction costs and avoid national/local elite capture. Last, but not least, the fair
distribution of any beneﬁt mechanism depends partly on the degree of transparency and good
management of the related revenues (Otto et al, 2006; Peskett, 2011; Luttrell et al, 2012). This is
not the case in the Cameroonian model. In this respect, based on the observations and the key
gaps we identiﬁed in our case study with regard to effectiveness, efﬁciency and equity, the
redistribution mechanism in force in Cameroon could be improved as follows:
● Carry out a systematic inventory to obtain a true picture of the area of land in the national
domain that has already been occupied and the one granted/leased under contract.
● Ensure that all operators in the national domain, without exception, pay land rents as
prescribed by the regulation in force.
● Set the ﬂoor and ceiling (minimum and maximum) prices of the value of a hectare of
conceded land in the national domain.
● Complete current regulatory provisions with another statutory instrument that would ﬁx the
price and terms of institutional redistribution, use and monitoring and evaluation of land
rent, avoiding bureaucratic channels that can induce transaction costs.
● Launch competitive bid solicitations for the exploitation of land in the national domain that
is open to potential investors.
● Ensure the publication of all information relating to the occupation/use of land in the
national domain: publish what you sign, as in the Extractive Industries Transparency
Initiatives (EITI).
Any REDD+ beneﬁt distribution mechanism in Cameroon would require these preconditions
to be met to ensure effectiveness, efﬁciency and equity, not only of the beneﬁt-sharing
mechanism, but of a REDD+ mechanism in general.
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Notes
1. I concur with Deininger (2011) that REDD+is part of global land acquisitions in developing countries.
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2. The interviewee estimated at least CFA 8 billion (EUR 10 million) are embezzled each year by the
decentralized bodies of their administration in the framework of land fees in Cameroon, without any
accountability.
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